Operation Absolute Resolve: A Rendition Revival?
The extraordinary mission to capture Venezuelan President Nicholás Maduro marks a return to an old vision of American power and interventionism in the Western Hemisphere. It’s too soon to know what Maduro’s ouster will mean for the future of Venezuela and the broader implications for American foreign policy. However, one thing is clear: the operation was an unprecedented display of America’s military prowess that is sure to reverberate far beyond Caracas.
Few military operations are as bold and decisive as “Operation Absolute Resolve.” That a joint team of special operations forces and law enforcement personnel could infiltrate a hostile country and capture the sitting president with no loss of life or equipment is an incredible feat of “professionalism and precision.” Hollywood producers must be tripping all over themselves to buy the movie rights.
The operation also sends a powerful message to state and non-state actors that threaten US interests, especially those in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, the specter of future military action looms large throughout the region as the US seeks to “reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies.” Following Maduro’s capture, the Trump administration appeared emboldened, issuing new threats against multiple countries, including Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Iran, and even Greenland. The leaders of Mexican cartels, in particular, seem ripe for disruption. In a recent interview, Trump warned that “something will have to be done about Mexico,” despite Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum’s fierce opposition to any breach of Mexican sovereignty.
The US has already leveraged many of the lessons learned from the global war on terror to prosecute a new militarizedwar on drugs. Could an extraordinary rendition program targeting key cartel members be next?
Disrupting and dismantling Mexican drug cartels remains one of the administration’s top priorities, and many of the same enabling conditions are already in place, including a detailed intelligence picture, considerable operational capabilities, and a (dubious) legal rationale. Through initiatives like DEA’s Project Portero, which targets cartel “gatekeepers” and their associates operating along the Southwest Border, and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs, the US has developed substantial knowledge of cartel networks. Militarily, Mexico’s proximity to the US makes force projection much easier—the US has already surged assets to the Southwest Border and established new “National Defense Areas” near existing military bases. There is no shortage of firepower to support these types of operations.
The legal basis for taking unilateral military action in Mexico presents the biggest challenge to a renewed rendition program, at least in theory. Despite a classified memo from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Council authorizing military force against cartels, the general consensus is that striking another country and abducting it’s citizens violates international and US law, most notably the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, and the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which restricts the president’s ability to use military force without Congressional approval.
Of course, that hasn’t stopped previous administrations, and there is precedent for this kind of activity. In 1985, after Mexican drug traffickers abducted, tortured, and killed DEA Special Agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena in Guadalajara, the US launched a cross-border raid to arrest Humberto Álvarez Machain, a Mexican doctor accused of aiding Camarena’s murder by “prolonging his life so that others could further torture and interrogate him.” The operation was not without risk. At the time, the abduction of Álvarez Machain touched off a major diplomatic crisis and raised serious legal questions about American interventionism. Ultimately, tensions subsided and the case reached the US Supreme Court, which ruled that “forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country’s criminal laws.” Could history repeat itself?
If Operation Absolute Resolve is any indication, operationally, the US shouldn’t have much trouble conducting “snatch and grab” operations in Mexico, although the failed capture of Ovidio Guzmán López, one of the leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel, in October 2019 illustrates just how quickly these engagements can go sideways. Beyond the potential loss of life, there are a host of other very good reasons to carefully consider such action. I won’t attempt rehash them all here, but the unintended consequences from prior rendition programs should serve as a cautionary tale for any future forays in Mexico or elsewhere.
As the saying goes, just because you can do something doesn’t mean you should. Before deciding whether to use military force in Mexico, it is important to consider not just the immediate tactical outcomes, but also carefully weigh the potential long-term impacts. With that calculus in mind, it would be prudent for the US not to “eff-around” lest it “find out.”
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