The UAE’s maritime infrastructure in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea has reduced volatility risks along a corridor essential to global price stability.

The Red Sea does not merely serve as a commercial shipping route. It is a corridor for price formation in the global energy market. Even minor disruptions across the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal translate into higher freight rates, increased insurance premiums, delivery delays, and higher global prices for oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). These costs ultimately flow through to US consumers, amplifying inflationary pressures and complicating Washington’s efforts to stabilize global energy markets. The continuity of energy flows along this route is therefore a central strategic interest of the United States, one that can only be preserved through sustained deterrence and meaningful burden-sharing among allies, a point highlighted in the National Defense Strategy published only days ago.

At the same time, no other maritime chokepoint in the world has been subjected to escalating security threats to quite the same extent as the coastlines of Yemen and Somalia. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia both rely on this route for their energy exports to Europe and other Western markets, but their approaches to mitigating risks emanating from Yemen have diverged sharply. Only one of these strategies has consistently aligned operational choices with US maritime and energy-security priorities.

Most recently, Saudi Arabia has emphasized restraint and de-escalation with the Houthis, preferring conflict resolution among regional actors while sidelining US intervention. While framed as regional diplomacy, this posture has weakened deterrence and constrained Washington’s ability to protect energy shipping from Iran’s most active maritime proxy. In contrast, the UAE has pursued a comprehensive, regionally integrated approach to maritime security in close coordination with the United States and allied partners, absorbing operational risks that others have deliberately avoided.

How the Houthi Movement Threatens Energy Security

The rise of the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) and the collapse of Yemen’s security apparatus since 2014 have constituted the primary source of risk to tanker traffic carrying oil and LNG along the Red Sea route. The Houthis’ reliance on the Islamic Republic of Iran for financing, weapons deliveries, and strategic guidance has meant that the war in Gaza and the broader Israel–Iran confrontation directly triggered an escalation of attacks on the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), and allied shipping. From Washington’s perspective, these attacks represent a direct challenge to the US-led energy security order and the credibility of maritime deterrence.

Since 2023, roughly 80 percent of container shipping has been diverted from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, adding between 10 and 14 days to transit times. Tankers have demonstrated greater willingness to continue transiting the corridor, but only at the cost of heightened security measures and sharply increased insurance premiums. These disruptions have undercut US efforts to contain inflation and stabilize global supply chains at a politically sensitive moment.

With Iran facing internal strain and anticipating renewed US pressure and even renewed military action on its soil, the strategic value of the Houthis has increased. Tehran has long used the group as a lever to threaten maritime energy flows. The continuation of attacks on shipping, combined with broader regional instability, risks catastrophic supply-chain disruptions. The resulting spike in energy prices would place renewed inflationary pressure on Washington and governments across the industrialized world, a scenario which the United States cannot afford to tolerate.

Comparing Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s Models

Since the outset of the war in Yemen, the UAE has consistently oriented its military, diplomatic, and investment efforts toward protecting freedom of navigation. From participating in the initial US-led naval blockade of Yemen and securing the port city of Aden, to expelling al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) from Mukalla, the UAE has worked to deny the Houthis access to coastal launch points. This strategy directly advanced US maritime objectives by shaping the physical geography of disruption along critical sea lanes.

Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has focused more narrowly on the diplomatic optics of restoring Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Neutralizing Houthi aerial threats to Saudi oil infrastructure became the central objective of this strategy. In practice, this amounted to prioritizing the protection of Saudi assets while externalizing maritime risk to US and allied naval forces.

Ceasefires have also been central to Riyadh’s approach, including the surprising visit of a Houthi delegation to Riyadh in September 2023. From an American perspective, such engagement weakened deterrence at a moment when sustained pressure on Iran’s proxy was required to protect energy shipping. After early coalition setbacks, Saudi priorities shifted toward insulating failing Vision 2030 projects and domestic energy infrastructure, including the pursuit of diplomatic accommodation with Tehran. While Saudi Arabia has branded itself as a stabilizer in global energy markets, it has notably avoided operational commitments in the Red Sea that could expose its assets to risk, to the detriment of US energy-security interests.

Strategic Implications for US Partner Reliability

This vacuum of leadership has been filled by the UAE. Abu Dhabi maintained close ties with southern Yemeni forces even after formally withdrawing from the Saudi-led coalition, while combining diplomacy, security assistance, and investment to secure long-term energy flows. Over time, the UAE developed a strategic network of naval, air, and commercial facilities across the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean, including Socotra, Abd al-Kuri, Samhah, Mayyun, Bosaso, and Berbera. This network has effectively extended the operational reach of US and allied forces without requiring permanent American basing, directly supporting Washington’s burden-sharing objectives.

In late 2025, Saudi support for the Presidential Leadership Council resulted in pressure on the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council, contributing to the fragmentation of anti-Houthi forces. These developments weakened the collective capacity to prevent attacks on tankers and undermined broader US efforts to secure the Red Sea corridor. Meanwhile, the Houthis continue to restrict exports from northern Yemeni ports such as Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Isa, which also serve as launch points for maritime attacks.

The UAE’s regional foresight and operational readiness are particularly valuable in this context, as they reduce the burden placed on US forces tasked with ad hoc maritime security operations along the Red Sea route.

Geopolitical conditions may now be compelling a recalibration of Saudi policy, as reflected in reports of a Riyadh-led Red Sea naval task force involving Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea. Absent close coordination with existing UAE-backed frameworks, however, such initiatives risk fragmenting rather than strengthening US-aligned maritime security efforts.

Alliance Credibility in an Era of Energy Disruption 

These divergent approaches carry implications well beyond the Red Sea. Allies that hedge during moments of crisis may protect their autonomy, but they weaken collective energy security and common security interests. Over time, such asymmetries could erode US confidence in partner reliability. The UAE, by contrast, has demonstrated a willingness to absorb risk in support of system stability—precisely the type of partnership the United States increasingly values in safeguarding global energy flows.

About the Author: Maryam Mahmud

Maryam Mahmud is a London-based law student with a strong academic and personal interest in international law, particularly as it relates to the Middle East. Her legal interests include public international law, human rights, state responsibility, and the interaction between international legal frameworks and regional politics in the MENA region. She is especially drawn to questions of accountability, sovereignty, and the protection of civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings. 

Outside of her studies and her interest in law, Maryam enjoys writing and research that bridge law with history and current affairs, aiming to make complex legal issues more accessible to wider audiences. She is also interested in diaspora communities and the role of law in social change. Through her work, she hopes to contribute thoughtfully to global legal and policy discussions.

Image: byvalet/shutterstock

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