All Too Quiet On The Nigerian Front: A Response To Matthew Page Of Chatham House – OpEd

There has been a lot of expert discussion over the last few days about how the Government of Nigeria has managed to "maintain good relations with Washington despite Trump's threats and US air strikes on northern Nigeria." While the Government of Nigeria has certainly made a concerted effort to constructively engage the Trump Administration on the "Christian genocide" issue, Matthew Page is spot on in pointing out that nothing the Government of Nigeria has done has fixed "the fundamental deficiencies ... that continue to hobble its security sector." He therefore offers up the suggestion that "Nigeria's leaders would be wise to provide Trump with occasional wins – like the Christmas Day strikes – to forestall renewed US interference or escalatory military action." That is sage advice. The problem is that it is also wholly inadequate.

The Tinubu Regime might be able to temporarily forestall a U.S. unilateral military strike with a reported $9 million dollars in the pockets of well-placed U.S. lobbyists. However, the Government of Nigeria will struggle to stave off another round of escalation before the U.S, midterm elections. That is because the Government of Nigeria is not willing to implement the government-wide reforms being sought by U.S. special interest groups with close ties to the Trump Administration. 

Much like South Africa last year, there therefore seems to be an air of inevitability in what comes next for bilateral partnership. Unless the Tinubu Regime charts a different course, my assessment is that the Trump Administration is probably going to pursue another round of escalation before the end of the year. So, what might that look like?

First, the Trump Administration could designate one or more additional Nigeria-related organizations as Entities of Special Concern under the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2016 (Wolf Act). The Trump Administration could argue that there are sufficient grounds for making those designations. There are Nigeria-related organizations such as Ansaru, Lakurawa, Wulowulo, and violent extremist Fulani ethnic militia groups that have been linked to.abuses of religious freedom. There are also strong precedents for making those designations. The U.S. Government has already designated other Nigeria-related organizations such as Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa, and Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin as Entities of Special Concern under the Wolf Act. Since some of the additional Nigeria-related organizations are offshoots of these already designated ones, it would be hard to imagine that there would be much pushback from the U.S. Congress.

Second, the Trump Administration could designate one or more Nigeria-related violent criminal organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. The Trump Administration could argue that there are sufficient grounds for making those designations. There are Nigeria-related organizations such as the Airlords, Maphite, Black Axe, and Vikings that are known to be connected to international cartels such as the Sicilian Mafia and Primeiro Comando da Capital. Some have even been connected to prostitution rings, narcotics networks, money laundering platforms, and extremely violent crimes across Europe and the United States. There are also strong precedents for making those designations. In the last year, the Trump Administration has designated several other violent criminal organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Examples include Gran Grif, Viv Ansanm, Tren de Aragua, Cártel de Sinaloa, and La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).

Third, the Trump Administration could impose sanctions on Nigerian government officials who the U.S. Intelligence Community believes are responsible for Nigeria-related abuses of religious freedom under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. The Trump Administration could argue that there are sufficient grounds for imposing those sanctions. For example, there are some Nigerian government officials who appear to have played at least an indirect role in abuses of religious freedom. There are also strong precedents for imposing those sanctions. The U.S. Government previously imposed sanctions on Chinese government officials for being involved in abuses of the religious freedom of Turkic Muslims. 

Fourth, the Trump Administration could prohibit the U.S. Government from using taxpayer funds to assist those units pursuant to the Leahy Law. It could even impose sanctions on the units and leaders of the Nigerian security services for playing an indirect or direct role in abuses of religious freedom pursuant to a country-level sanctions program that builds on the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. The Trump Administration could argue that there are sufficient grounds for imposing either of those actions. For example, it has been widely reported that the Department of State Security gave advance warning of the Yelewata Massacre to the Nigerian Armed Forces. However, the local Nigerian military unit reportedly failed to prevent the attack. There are also strong precedents for imposing those sanctions. The U.S. Government previously imposed sanctions on units and leaders of the Burmese security services for human rights abuses of the Rohingya people.

Fifth, the Trump Administration could direct federal agencies to put maximum legal pressure on Nigerian government officials and their patronage support networks. There are already several legal cases that could be operationalized for that purpose. Under the Biden Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, and Drug Enforcement Agency invoked a Glomar denial to withhold confirmation on whether the U.S. Government has information on international drug trafficking ties of Nigerian President Bola Tinubu. Under the Trump Administration, the U.S. Department of Justice launched an investigation into MTN Group. It would be rather easy for the Trump Administration to expand the scope of that investigation to include MTN Group activities in Nigeria. That includes how exactly MTN Group resolved its multi-billion dollar fine by the Government of Nigeria. However, those options are minor in comparison to a potential whole-of-government investigation into potential U.S. nexuses to the illicit financing of electoral politics in Nigeria. That would be of grave concern to many Nigerian government officials and their patronage support networks. As noted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, the guidelines and regulations on the financing of electoral politics tend to be "violated with impunity in Nigeria." 

To be clear, these are only a few of the policy options available to the Trump Administration. The White House has a very big playbook of coercive measures at its disposal. That is exactly why everyone should avoid the temptation to jump to the conclusion that the Government of Nigeria has succeeded in flipping the page on the Trump Administration. As US-South Africa relations remind us, we are only one social media post away from another crisis in US-Nigeria relations.

• Michael Walsh is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute