Balochistan’s Unfinished Conflict: Geography, Grievance And The Limits Of Force – OpEd

Balochistan rarely captures sustained international attention unless violence erupts. When it does, the province is often reduced to a narrow set of descriptions: Pakistan’s largest and poorest region, a mineral-rich hinterland plagued by insurgency, a security challenge to be contained. The latest wave of coordinated attacks across the province, including the fighting in the border town of Nushki, once again push Balochistan into spotlight. But it also exposes a deeper reality. This is not merely a law-and-order issue. It endures because history, geography, and a persistent deficit of trust between the state and the people continue to reinforce one another.

Balochistan covers 347000 square kilometers which equals 44 percent of Pakistan. The region has a large area which contains mountainous terrain and few inhabitants. The region has less than 15 million residents who occupy the deserts and mountain ranges and outlying valleys between Afghanistan and Iran. The province controls regional trade routes because its 760-kilometer Arabian Sea coastline starts from Gwadar port. The dry landscape of the region conceals Pakistan's most important mineral resources which include copper and gold and coal and natural gas. These assets, however, have been both a promise and a curse.

Violence Returns, the State Responds

The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) conducted its recent attacks followed its established pattern of conducting simultaneous assaults against police stations, Frontier Corps facilities banks, and civilian locations across multiple towns. The militants in Nushki seized control of security installations which triggered a three-day counterterrorism operation that used helicopters and drones together with army and paramilitary force reinforcements. Similar pattern attacks were reported in other districts including Quetta, Dalbandin, Kalat, Pasni, and Gwadar.

Pakistan’s security forces responded swiftly. Officials say dozens of militants were killed, strategic installations were secured, and control was restored within hours or days. From the state’s perspective, the outcome demonstrated operational preparedness and intelligence-led response. The campaign branded by militants as “Herof 2.0” failed to achieve any strategic gains.

The tactical success of security operations demonstrates military effectiveness but fails to answer why armed violence in Balochistan continues after repeated government efforts to control it.

A Conflict Older Than Pakistan

Balochistan’s troubled relationship with the Pakistani state predates the country itself. At the time of partition in 1947, the region was not a single political unit but a mosaic of directly administered areas and princely states, most notably the Khanate of Kalat. Its accession to Pakistan in March 1948-viewed by many Baloch nationalists as coerced-sparked the first rebellion. Subsequent uprisings followed in 1958, the 1960s, the 1970s, and again from the early 2000s onward.

Each phase followed a similar pattern: political exclusion and economic grievance, armed resistance, a forceful state response, and a temporary pause left core issues unresolved.

Those grievances have changed shape over time but not substance. Critics argue that Balochistan’s resources have powered national development while local communities remain marginalized. Natural gas discovered in the province in the 1950s fueled industries across Pakistan long before many Baloch districts received access themselves. Today, mega-projects such as Reko Diq and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor are seen by many locals not as opportunities, but as extraction without consent.

Militancy and the Erosion of Legitimacy

Armed groups like the BLA present themselves as liberation movements. Their actions increasingly contradict that claim. Attacks on laborers, women, public institutions, and mixed-population neighborhoods have eroded whatever political legitimacy such groups once sought to establish. Violence that harms ordinary people blurs the line between insurgency and coercion.

Human rights organizations have criticized the state's extensive security presence. The Baloch population particularly the younger and urbanized groups continue to accuse the government for enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Where accountability mechanisms appear weak or opaque, the state’s moral authority is strained even as it confronts militant violence.

Geography Favors the Insurgent

The difficult task of securing Balochistan arises from its complex natural environment. The combination of extensive deserts and steep mountains and open border areas enables militants to move freely while establishing hidden operational bases. The security forces face an overwhelming task because they need to protect a region that exceeds the size of most nations which contains few people and has minimal security resources.

Various analysts argues that security forces without resident support cannot eliminate the terrorism in such circumstances.  Where trust is absent, intelligence dries up. Where fear replaces legitimacy, the state remains reactive rather than preventive.

Development Without Dialogue

Islamabad has long argued that development is the answer.The government uses investment in ports and mines and road construction and energy projects as a method to create economic stability. Balochistan requires employment opportunities and essential services and transportation links without any doubt. The development process needs political dialogue to succeed because political dialogue serves as the essential solution to resolve existing conflicts.

Baloch people consider their main complaint to be their lack of control over their own affairs rather than the absence of development projects. Decisions affecting Quetta and surrounding districts are often perceived as being made in Islamabad, corporate boardrooms, or foreign capitals. Without meaningful participation, economic initiatives risk appearing imposed rather than shared.

Beyond the Security Lens

The violence in Nushki once again illustrate the limits of a security-first approach. Military operations can disrupt attacks and degrade militant networks. Military operations can stop attacks while they dismantle terrorist organizations. The solution to these matters requires methods which extend beyond military power.

A sustainable path forward requires recalibration: credible political dialogue, transparent processes to address missing-persons cases, fair distribution of resource revenues, and governance structures grounded in local legitimacy. Such confidence-building measures are not concessions to militancy; they are prerequisites for durable stability.

Balochistan’s conflict is neither inevitable nor insoluble. But as long as it is framed primarily as a counterterrorism problem rather than a political one, the cycle of violence will persist-flaring, subsiding, and returning, each time at a higher cost to both the province and the Pakistani state.