The US is stretching itself dangerously thin in the Indo-Pacific
Washington’s desire to maintain U.S. hegemony in the Indo-Pacific does little to secure America’s vital interests.
China’s determination to reunify with Taiwan and the Philippines’ desire to favorably resolve disputes in the South China Sea indicate U.S. dominance of the Indo-Pacific region is doing little to preserve peace and stability. While Washington focuses on bolstering its military spending and presence to maintain regional dominance, Chinese President Xi Jinping is achieving diplomatic victories with Vietnam, South Korea, Japan and Bhutan that ultimately advance Chinese interests.
More U.S. hard power in the region will not reverse Beijing’s course.
Maintaining regional hegemony in Asia isn’t worth the cost. Tens of billions of dollars from the $875 billion National Defense Authorization Act is slated to support U.S. dominance in the Indo-Pacific, adding to the nearly $34 trillion national debt. The debt is projected to grow to over $45 trillion by 2027, with government interest payments on the debt expected to be around $3 trillion per year. This is almost the same amount spent on Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. With “higher for longer” interest rates the global norm, the economic growth needed to sustain interest payments is not guaranteed.
A U.S. debt crisis is a greater threat to the nation than America losing its dominance in the Indo-Pacific. If debt servicing continues to increase its share of the federal budget, Washington will likely be forced to make a catastrophic choice between significantly weakening essential government spending or defaulting on the debt. Both would have drastic consequences for U.S. national security and economic prosperity.
China is already reducing its exposure to U.S. debt, in part to reduce sovereign risk. A U.S. economic meltdown would severely weaken American power.
Even without a hegemonic policy in Asia, the United States would likely maintain its economic benefit — and at a lower cost. A prominent argument for preserving U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific is because it provides an economic advantage. However, as reshoring and nearshoring accelerate, Asia will become less important to U.S. economic prosperity. Moreover, the trade rules governing the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and, yes, even the Chinese-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership are based on Washington’s policies. These rules, which will become more difficult to change as more countries join the trade pacts, will influence regional economics and trade for the foreseeable future.
Setting economic factors aside, U.S. dominance in Asia is unsustainable. Historically, dominance doesn’t last. Even more so for maritime empires — see the fall of the 20th century colonial empires. Even China, India and Japan could not sustain their regional hegemonies.
China and India’s resurgence as great powers further challenges America’s ability to remain the dominant power in Asia. Both China and India seek to restore their historical greatness and influence in East and South Asia. They want to protect and advance their respective national interests. Beijing and New Delhi already pursue independent foreign policies, despite those who believe India could become a U.S.-aligned ally. Differences with China aside, India’s devotion to national unity, to the extent that it is willing to assassinate or attempt to kill separatist leaders in Canada and the United States, shows that a powerful India will demand a greater say in Asia.
Geographically, total dominance of Asia — from Japan to India — is a pipe dream, especially for the United States. Logistically, U.S. power projection will be limited by the Pacific Ocean and U.S. allies’ willingness to support shows of force. U.S. leadership on the continent itself is effectively impossible considering the lack of serious land power presence. But this is the same for the Asian great powers.
The Pacific and Indian Oceans will restrict China, India and even Japan’s ability to dominate the region. Moreover, India and China must grapple with diverse geographies — such as the Himalayas, the Gobi Desert, and the jungles of Southeast Asia — and distances of thousands of miles, which will limit their abilities to lead the region.
Instead of overreaching, Washington should face reality and shift its Indo-Pacific policy to concentrate on securing America’s vital interests. Focus less on building up America’s hard power presence and assist U.S. treaty allies in the region in strengthening themselves to reduce risk to U.S. personnel. Increase regional diplomacy and emphasize areas of mutual interest, particularly economic security and prosperity. Avoid symbolic activities, like joint patrols in the South China Sea, that spur regional tensions but provide no gains for the United States.
Most importantly, Washington should face reality and recognize that China and India are great powers desiring a greater say in regional affairs. We need to begin planning for this new state in a way that avoids starting a conflict while securing U.S. economic interests in the region. Only by shifting to a sustainable and realistic Asia strategy can America preserve its national interests in the region.
Quinn Marschik is a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities.